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1 Introduction 
In different jurisdictions the growing use of online facilities has been taken into account. The 
Norwegian government has the goal of deepening the acceptance, trust building and legal 
certainty of electronic communication in the same way as traditional written communication 
because electronic communication is used more and more.
1
 Electronic communication should 
fulfil the legal requirements set up in different laws for communication.
2
 Electronic 
communication should have a broad understanding and should be applied to all sorts of 
electronic cooperation.
3
 This should lead not to a duty to use electronic communication means 
but to develop coexistence between electronic and paper-based communication.
4
 One of these 
attempts to equate electronic communication with paper-base communication is the equation of 
handwritten and electronic signatures. The technology which was developed to fulfil similar 
functions of a handwritten signature is called electronic or digital signatures. The Electronic 
Signatures Directive (ESD) and its Norwegian implementation contains in Art. 5 ESD and 
Section 6 Norwegian Electronic Signatures Act (ESA) rules which say that electronic or digital 
signatures should be equalised with a handwritten signature.  
1.1 Subject 
This thesis asks the question if the Section 6 Norwegian Electronic Signatures Act (ESA) 
implements Art. 5 Electronic Signature Directive (ESD) correctly because there are some 
differences between Section 6 ESA and Art. 5 ESD. They will be discussed in this thesis under 
the focus of whether Section 6 ESA complies with Art. 5 ESD or not. To discuss the 
implementation thorough not only the two regulations have to be compared because some 
requirements of both regulations are defined in other regulations. In the first four chapters the 
very similar requirements for both laws will be described and compared. Beneath a general 
                                                 
1
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4
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chapter the technological requirements of Art. 5 I ESD and Section 6 ESA will be discussed in 
one chapter. Although some of these requirements such as advanced electronic signatures, 
qualified certificates, certification service providers and secure-signature-creation devices are 
regulated in other provisions, it is necessary to compare them as well. If they do not resemble the 
technical background  Art. 5 ESD and Section 6 ESA will not comply with each other. This can 
result in different sorts of electronic signatures Art. 5 ESD and Section 6 ESA affect. Then the 
consequences of the Norwegian implementation will be discussed under the focus of the EFTA-
Court legislation. Because of some legislation of the EFTA-Court is based on decisions of the 
ECJ, the necessary ECJ-decisions will be discussed as well.   
3 
 
 
1.2 What might electronic signatures be useful for? 
A lot of communication is done electronically today, for example within a company employees 
usually use E-Mails or other electronic means to communicate with each other, contract drafts 
are exchanged via E-Mail. An electronic signature should fulfil the same functions as a 
handwritten signature to reach the same legal recognition. A handwritten signature has got 
different functions
5
:  
 Data authority authentication 
 Integrity 
 Non-repudiation 
 Verification 
 Forgery 
 Link between authentication tool and content 
 Verifiable as long as the legal act is of legal importance 
 Secure Date 
Although a handwritten signature often does not fulfil these functions technically because it is 
relatively easy to copy while verification is difficult if the real and verified signature is missing.
6
 
If an electronic signature can fulfil these functions like a handwritten signature does, it can take 
over as an electronic substitute of a handwritten signature. 
The same evidential weight as handwritten signatures should also be granted to electronic 
signatures before court to avoid the following. Often the electronic communication between two 
parties is printed out and given as evidence before court.
7
 The problem with these prints can be 
that a manipulation of an electronic document is hardly detectable
8
 and a later change of the 
document is claimed before court by one of the parties. Another point to consider is that it might 
be more convenient to give evidence in an electronic form. The question of subsequent changes 
can be a crucial point before court if the content of a contract is discussed.  Most judges and 
                                                 
5
 Dumortier, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, Vol. II, p. 54 f. 
6
 Dumortier, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, Vol. II, p. 56. 
7
 Thorvaldsen, Skomedal, Ericson, Bevisverdien av elektronisk informasjon, Revisjon og Regnskap, 4/2007, p.1 
8
 Thorvaldsen, Skomedal, Ericson, Bevisverdien av elektronisk informasjon, Revisjon og Regnskap, 4/2007, p.1. 
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lawyers do not have the knowledge to detect changes in electronic documents. Even for experts it 
is very difficult to detect manipulations of electronic communications. Therefore the parties have 
the obligation to use secure electronic means if they communicate electronically. One of a 
possible method to do this is the use of digital or electronic signatures. Especially electronic 
signatures that are based on a PKI are capable of detecting changes within the electronic 
communication.  
Electronic signatures are also a means to authenticate the senders.  
To ensure that judges do not reject electronic documents as evidence and to hinder establishing a 
barrier in the use of electronic communications the EU-Commission decided to give rules for the 
legal recognition of electronic signatures which has to be implemented within all Member States 
of the EU and all EEA-States. The only problem with the equivalence with a handwritten 
signature is that electronic signatures can prove something more than a handwritten signature 
does, because the technology producing digital signatures can also be used for other purposes.
9
 
But ESD and ESA do not exclude the use of other functions of electronic signatures technology 
because both laws take only one specific function, the signing function, the technology can have. 
Other authentication methods or cryptographic functions of the technology are not affected by 
these regulations.  
                                                 
9
 Dumortier, The Legal Aspects of Digital Signatures, Vol. VI, p. 31. 
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1.3 Technology 
As the way in which electronic signatures work can be difficult to understand I will give a 
general overview of how the systems work. The ESD and the ESA deal with three different sorts 
of signatures: an electronic signature can be every electronic data that authenticates someone if it 
is attached to an electronic document.
10
 In terms of information security authentication can be 
defined as data origin authentication, integrity of contents and non-repudiation of the author.
11
 
Some say that this can be everything from a typed name under an E-Mail
12
 or a scanned 
handwritten signature
13
 to a more sophisticated use of a simple encryption signature.
14
  
Although these methods to authenticate do not cover perfectly all requirements the definition of 
authentication presumes, these methods can serve those functions.  
 Encryption technology is used to „sign‟ an electronic document. The advanced electronic 
signature is said to describe so-called digital signatures which are based on encryption 
technology. The general principle can be described as a reverse use of encryption keys. There are 
two different systems of encryption used today. One is the symmetric or private key encryption 
and the other is the asymmetric encryption or public key encryption.
15
  
If one uses a private key encryption both parties encrypt and decrypt with the same key.
16
 The 
disadvantage of this system is that both parties have to know the key to decrypt and encrypt in 
advance
17
. The crucial point is the key exchange mechanism so no intruder can gain the key. 
Then the intruder is not able to impersonate one of the parties.
18
 The risk can be reduced by 
using a key only once but this solution seems to be rather impractical.
19
 If a private key 
                                                 
10
 See definitions Art. 2 (1) ESD, Section 3 (a) NESA. 
11
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures,Vol. II, p. 52. 
12
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 280; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. I, p. 8. 
13
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. I, p. 8. 
14
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. I, p. 8. 
15
 Brazell, 3-037; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures,Vol. II, p. 25; Nordén Electronic Signatures in 
a legal context, 8.2.1; Reed, What is a signature, 4.3. 
16
 Brazell, 3-037; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 25; Nordén Electronic Signatures in 
a legal context, 8.2.1; Reed, What is a signature, 4.3. 
17
 Brazell, 3-037; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 25; Nordén Electronic Signatures in 
a legal context, 8.2.1. 
18
 Brazell, 3-037. 
19
 Brazell, 3-037. 
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encryption is used for signing a message the problem arises if a non-repudiation function is not 
obtained.
20
  
More secure is public key encryption. Each party has two keys: one public and one private key.
21
 
For encryptions purposes the keys are used as followed: to encrypt a message the message must 
be encrypted with the public key and decrypted with the private because that ensures the secrecy 
of the message.
22
 The public key can published without the security a private key needs as the 
private key is only used for decryption and the public key only for encryption.
23
 The decryption 
without the appropriate key is usually difficult within such a system because the public key 
algorithm usually uses difficult mathematical problems to generate the keys.
24
 The advantage of 
this system is that the private keys must not be exchanged.
25
 Therefore it is difficult for an 
intruder to find out what the private key is and to impersonate one of the key-holders.  
This technology can be used as signing means for an electronic document if it is used in a 
reversed way than in the encryption purposes.
26
 The private key is then used for encryption and 
the public key for decryption.
27
 To sign an electronic message three steps have to be taken 
 1. Produce a unique thumbprint of the message. This thumbprint is often a hash value that 
is a fixed-sized number derived from the electronic message that should be signed. This 
value is unique for every message.
28
  
 2. The hash value is then encrypted using the private key of the user and the encrypted 
hash value is attached as string of data to the message.
29
  
 3. The receiver of the message decrypts the hash value with the public key, generates a 
second hash value with the public key and compares the two hash values.
30
  
                                                 
20
 Electronic Signatures in a legal context, 8.2.1. 
21
 Brazell, 3-037; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 25; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in 
a legal context, 8.2.1; Riisnæs, p. 56. 
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 Feghhi, Feghhi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 37 f. 
23
 Brazell, 3-037; Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 25; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in 
a legal context, 8.2.1. 
24
 Brazell, 3-037; Feghhi, Feghhi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 37 f. 
25
 Brazell, 3-037. 
26
 Brazell, 3-040. 
27
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 30 f; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in a legal 
context, 8.2.1. 
28
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 30 f; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in a legal 
context, 8.2.1. 
29
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 30 f; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in a legal 
context, 8.2.1. 
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This shows two things:
31
 The receiver can verify that the hash value has been encrypted with the 
sender‟s private key and that the message has not been altered because every alternation of the 
message produces another hash value.
32
  
Such a system can look like this: often smart cards are used to sign an electronic document. The 
signature creation data can be stored on a PC or on an USB-device. Usually a smart card is used 
to store the private key on it. In general the hash value is send to the smart card which generates 
then the encrypted hash value and returns it back.
33
 The advantage smart cards have is that they 
can not be tampered with, that means it is not possible to read the stored information without the 
password or by physical means such as deriving the information from the processor by studying 
the structure.
34
 There are different smart card systems available.
35
  
                                                                                                                                                             
30
 Dumortier, The Legal aspects of Digital signatures, Vol. II, p. 30 f; Nordén, Electronic Signatures in a legal 
context, 8.2.1. 
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 Brazell, 3-040. 
32
 Nordén, Electronic Signatures in a legal context, 8.2.1. 
33
 Schellekens p. 51. 
34
 Schellekens p.51f. 
35
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2 General Description of Art. 5 ESD and Section 6 ESA 
Both laws set up rules for legal recognition of electronic signatures. As the Norwegian Law is an 
implementation of the ESD a lot of things are alike and can be found in both laws. In a very 
general way both laws have the same approach towards the regulation of electronic signatures. 
Both can be parted into two parts which deals with the legal recognition of different sorts of 
electronic signatures. This approach is called a two-track approach
36
 because it ties two different 
levels of legal recognition together in one regulation. With this approach the legislator tries to 
give a minimum recognition for all sorts of electronic signatures and a legal certainty to specific 
technology. Both laws combine a minimalist approach and a prescriptive approach.  
2.1 Art. 5 ESD 
Art. 5 ESD divides the legal recognition of digital signatures into two parts. Part one gives the 
same legal recognition to a so-called qualified signature
37
 in relation to an electronic document in 
the same manner a handwritten signature in relation to a written document does. In this part 
qualified signatures are as well admissible as piece of evidence as a handwritten signature. Part 
two is a non-discrimination rule for electronic signatures in general. This approach is called a 
two-track approach
38
 because it ties two different classes of legal recognition together in one 
regulation:  
 Track 1: the simple electronic signature cannot be discriminated just because it is 
electronic and/or not a qualified signature,  
 Track 2: the qualified signature has to be recognized as equivalent with a handwritten 
signature and is admissible as piece of evidence.
39
  
                                                 
36
 Bell, Gomez, Mayer-Schönberger, Electronic Signature Regulation, CLSR, Vol. 17, 399 (401). 
37
 Sjöberg, Nordén, Managing electronic Signaturs, fn. 11; Dumortier, The Legal and Market Aspects of Electronic 
Signatures, p. 150. 
38
 Bell, Gomez, Mayer-Schönberger, Electronic Signature Regulation, CLSR, Vol. 17, 399 (401). 
39
 Bell, Gomez, Mayer-Schönberger, Electronic Signature Regulation, CLSR, Vol. 17, 399 (400). 
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With this structure the EU implemented a two-tiered approach, which combines a minimalist 
approach and a prescriptive approach.
40
 The minimalist approach contains only a non-
discrimination rule for electronic-signatures like that one in Art 5 II ESD.
41
 The prescriptive 
approach mandates the functions of one specific technology it describes in the law.
42
 This is done 
in Art. 5 I ESD in which an advanced electronic signature must be based on a qualified signature 
and must be created by a secure signature-creation-device to gain equivalence with a handwritten 
signature and to be admissible as a  piece of evidence. Art. 5 ESD shows a high flexibility 
because it gives legal certainty to a certain type of electronic signatures and ensures a minimum 
recognition for all forms of electronic signatures.
43
  
                                                 
40
 Wang, Critical review, CLSR, Vol. 23, 32 (33-36). 
41
 Wang, Critical review, CLSR, Vol. 23, 32 (33). 
42
 Wang, Critical review, CLSR, Vol. 23, 32 (34); Kuner, ILPF working paper, on: 
http://www.ilpf.org/groups/analysis_IEDSII.htm, visited: 24.11.2009. 
43
 Wang, Critical review, CLSR, Vol. 23, 32 (36). 
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2.2 Section 6 ESA 
Section 6 of the Norwegian Electronic Signatures Act (ESA) deals with the legal recognition of 
electronic signatures. In the Norwegian Law the two-tier approach is found as well. This 
approach is again displayed in the structure of the Section: the Section consists of two sentences. 
The first sentence contains the legal recognition of a qualified signature. The second sentence 
contains a legal recognition of an electronic signature as a basic rule. The first sentence deals 
with a high-technology solution that shall be equal to a handwritten signature. Section 6 S. 1 of 
the Norwegian ESA contains the legal recognition of a qualified signature. It says that if in a law 
or regulation or in any other means a requirement is laid down for signatures in order to obtain a 
specific legal effect and the provision may be implemented electronically, a qualified signature 
shall in every case meet such a requirement.
44
  The second sentence has an approach for low 
technology solutions or technology solutions that does not fulfil all requirements of a qualified 
signature that might be equal to a handwritten signature. The prescriptive approach can be found 
in the first sentence where a certain technology is getting equivalence with a handwritten 
signature. The second sentence represents the minimalist approach because every electronic 
signature can gain a certain legal recognition. Again the Norwegian law shows the same 
flexibility like the Directive.  
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 Unofficial translation by http://www.npt.no/ikbViewer/Content/1379/1379-electronic_signatures_act.pdf; visited 
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3 Qualified Signature 
This subchapter will first explain which requirements an electronic signature has to fulfil accor-
ding to Art. 5 I ESD and Section 6 S. 1 ESA to be a qualified signature. In this work a qualified 
signature will be defined as an advanced electronic signature based on a qualified certificate and 
which is created by a secure-signature-creation device. 
45
  
3.1 Advanced electronic signature 
An advanced electronic signature is defined in Art. 2 (2) ESD and Section 3 No. 2 ESA as an 
electronic signature which meets the following requirements: 
 it is uniquely linked to the signatory; 
 it is capable of identifying the signatory; 
 it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and 
 it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of 
the data is detectable. 
The technique thought to fulfil this definition is a type of asymmetric cryptography.
46
 The requi-
rements are fulfilled by signatures which are based on a PKI system using the RSA-algorithm.
47
 
3.1.1 Uniquely linked to the signatory 
As the private key and the public key belong together a signature shows that the message has 
been signed with the private key that belongs to the public key.
48
 It is therefore possible to 
identify the private key with this system.
49
 If someone knows that the sender owns the private 
key and knows beyond all doubt that the private key is not revealed and used by third persons or 
                                                 
45
 Art. 5 I ESD, Section 6 NESA, Unofficial translation by http://www.npt.no/ikbViewer/Content/1379/1379-
electronic_signatures_act.pdf; visited 23.07.2009. 
46
 Brazell, 5-033. 
47
 Feghhi, Feghhi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 38. 
48
 Brazell, 3-041. 
49
 Brazell, 3-041. 
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lost by the sender one can identify with this method the sender of the message.
50
 A problem is if 
the link between the two keys can be extended to the owner of the keys. Some argue that this is 
not the case because no one is capable to memorise a key due to its complexity.
51
 But in the real 
world the key will be stored on some storage device, for example in computer memories, floppy 
disks or smart cards.
52
 Therefore others argue that the requirement of Art. 2 (2) a) ESD/ Section 
3 No. 2 ESA must be interpreted to mean a unique logical link between the signature and the 
signatory.
53
 For this interpretation the third requirement in Art. 2 (2) c) ESD should also speak 
because it explicitly allows storage devices.
54
  
The second argumentation has an important point because all storage devices are possessed. In 
some legislation possession gives the presumption for ownership.
55
 This means for storage 
devices that the person who possesses the device is the owner. The problem is, if one can 
presume that the data on the storage device also belongs to the possessor and owner of the 
storage device. This can be still doubted. Therefore the argumentation that the possession of a 
storage device helps to establish a unique link between electronic signature and the signatory 
does not help. I think this link can only be established if one can make the presumption that a key 
holder usually does not reveal his private key to others. But this presumption can only be 
established if the time has proved this. The German Bundesgerichtshof takes that view in its 
decision XI ZR 210/03. The judges presume that if the right PIN is used when someone takes 
cash from an ATM the bank account holder took that money
56
. The judges think therefore that 
there is a unique link between PINs and bank account holders. A reasoning of this presumption 
can be found in decision 9 U 63/01 of Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart. The judges think that the PIN 
is delivered to the customer and secured in a way so that it is not possible that a third person can 
retrieve the data from the bank via manipulations or guess the PIN by a brute force attack. The 
only way according to these courts to get knowledge of the PIN is if the holder of the PIN is 
acting negligently. This means for the technology as such, the PIN is uniquely linked to the bank 
                                                 
50
 Feghhi, Feghhi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 46. 
51
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 148; Brazell 5-046. 
52
 Brazell 5-046. 
53
 Brazell 5-046. 
54
 Brazell 5-046. 
55
 See Section 1006 BGB. 
56
 BGH, XI ZR 210/03, p. 11; Kindl/Werner CR 2006, 353 (359).  
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account holder. Therefore one have to say for now that the requirement of an unique link 
between electronic signature and signatory exists only if the private key is hold secret so only the 
signatory can use it.  
3.1.2 Capable of identifying the signatory 
It is possible to identify the private key within a PKI-system because the private key and the 
public key are linked together.
57
 If someone knows that the sender owns the private key and 
knows beyond doubts that the private key is not revealed and used by third persons or lost by the 
sender one can identify via that link with this method the sender of the message.
58
 
3.1.3 Created by means under sole control of the signatory can maintain  
But the sender of the message has to exercise a sort of sole control over means that creates the 
signature. The above mentioned criterion of secrecy is taken over with the requirement “sole 
control”. This creates a problem because the recipient of a message signed with a private key 
cannot know if the private key is under the „sole control‟ of the sender if it is located on a 
computer or stored on a smartcard.
59
 The sender does not know who has access to the key data if 
the private key is stored on a computer or, if stored on a smartcard, the recipient does not know 
who is using the smartcard because it might be borrowed or stolen.
60
 According to a working 
paper of the FESA it is part of the nature of a digital environment that the signatory needs a 
comprehensible version of a security concept and confidence that the service provider sticks to 
the security concept.
61
Therefore the sender has to use some security measures to maintain sole 
control.
62
 With a good security concept a signatory can have even within a server-based system 
sole control over the private key argues the working paper.
63
 But there is room to argue that sole 
control implies a physical control about a thing because this question is dealing with the 
definition of sole control. Physical control is impossible to establish within a server based system 
that creates signatures because the data is not attached to a physical device. Therefore a server 
                                                 
57
 Brazell, 3-041. 
58
 Feghhi, Feghhi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 46. 
59
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 149. 
60
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 149. 
61
 Working Paper, found on Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 150. 
62
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 149. 
63
 Working Paper, found on Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 150. 
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based system is not able to create sole control over the means that create the signature.
64
 This 
means that sole control has got a physical component that has to be taken into account. 
Otherwise the meaning of „sole control‟ is being distorted.65 Sole control means therefore a 
physical power over the signature creation data which means one person is in charge to decide 
what should happen to the means. As physical power can only executed over physical things 
such an interpretation makes it necessary that the means are storage devices or computers.  
                                                 
64
 Footnote Working Paper, found on Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 150. 
65
 Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, p. 150. 
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3.1.4 Linked to the data that makes any change detectable 
The hash value generated from the message is unique for every message because the operation 
from the message to the hash value is not reversible; it is not possible to generate from an 
arbitrary message a particular desired hash value and is computationally infeasible to find two 
messages with the same hash value.
66
 Even the smallest changes are detectable.
67
 This means 
that an advanced electronic signature detects subsequent changes of a message because the two 
hash values will not match.
68
 The comparison between the two hash values fulfils this 
requirement. 
If all these requirements are fulfilled, a public key infrastructure fulfils the requirements of the 
advanced electronic signature according to Art. 2 (2) ESD and Section 3 No. 2. ESA 
3.1.5 Are there the same requirements for an advanced electronic signature? 
There are some differences between the definition of an advanced electronic signature between 
the ESA and the ESD. One difference is that Art. 2 (3) ESD is using the term „is linked to the 
data‟ while Section 3 No. 2 ESA is using the term „linked to electronic data‟. But actually there 
is no difference between those terms because Art. 2 (2) ESD defines an electronic signature as 
data in electronic form which is attached to (…) other electronic data (...). As „the data‟ indicates 
a certain form of data the term points to the definition of in Art. 2 (2) ESD. One has to take into 
account that an electronic signature can only sign an electronic document and not a physical 
document.  
More crucial is the following difference: The Directive says that the signature is „linked to the 
data to which it relates‟. The relation between the signature and the data is missing in the ESA. 
What is crucial is if this makes a difference in the meaning which does not comply with the 
Directive. The relation the Directive talks about means the relation between document and 
signature. As this relation is missing in the ESA there might occur the question if the ESA has 
not a wider definition of the advanced electronic signature than the Directive. But a signature 
                                                 
66
 Fegghi, Fegghi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 44. 
67
 Fegghi, Fegghi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 46. 
68
 Fegghi, Fegghi, Williams, Digital Certificates, p. 46. 
18 
 
which has no relation to the data of the signed document has no value because it has no function. 
The concept of a signature in a paper world is that it gives an indication that the document is 
produced by whoever signed it with all legal implications attributed to the signing by applicable 
law.
69
 This presumption is based on the assumption that a handwritten signature is unique to 
everyone
70
. But that assumption does not work with an electronic signature,
71
 because the 
electronic signature, which is a signed hash digest from the signed document does not have any 
function, actually does not work, without a document. As the Directive does not say what sort of 
relation should exist between the document and the electronic signature, it might be enough for 
the signature to be a mathematical result for which the document was one basic and important 
part. Because the whole signing operation would not work without document, there is a 
mathematical relation between the document and the signature. Another point is that the 
advanced electronic signature is thought to be the base for a qualified signature that fulfils the 
same functions as a handwritten signature. Therefore it should contain as well the implication 
about the origin of the data. 
Therefore there is always an underlying mathematical relation between the electronic document 
and the electronic signature. As this relation indicates the hint about the relation which is given 
in the Directive the requirement might be a mere declaration instead of a mandatory requirement. 
As this relation is always there it is not necessary to write such an obvious thing into the 
implementation.  
There is also a difference in the nature of sole control. The ESD requires for the sole control only 
the possibility of the signatory to have sole control over the means that creates an advanced 
electronic signature. The ESA is much stricter in this question because the sole control over the 
signature creation means seems to be mandatory. It is difficult to estimate what the phrase „can 
maintain sole control‟ in the ESD means. It can mean the possibility to exercise alone physical 
power over signature creation means. For the storage devices with the signature-creation data 
means the possibility to exercise physical power that the access to them has to be secured, e.g. 
the access to the computerdata must be protected by a password or the smartcard should be 
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locked if it is not used. The other possible meaning is that the signatory just has to have the 
possibility to install such security means. But this last meaning would degrade the requirement 
sole control to a meaningless requirement because this opportunity to secure the access to a 
computer or other electronic data with a password is a normal technical possibility. 
The ESA means that the signatory must have a physical control over the signature creation 
means. But such a physical control is not possible because it is not possible to watch always your 
computer or to hold a smart card always in your hands. Therefore the phrase „maintain sole 
control‟ must be interpreted according to social habits. This means it must be reasonable for 
everyone that the signatory is exercising sole control. This is possible if he installs security 
measures such as the before mentioned access controls. Therefore the phrases „maintain the sole 
control over signature creation means‟ and „can maintain the sole control over signature creation 
means‟ have the same meaning: the possibility to exercise physical power over the access to the 
signature creation means. 
Therefore Section 6 ESA complies with the definition of the Directive of an advanced electronic 
signature. 
3.2 Qualified Certificate 
Both laws require that the advanced electronic signature is based on a qualified certificate. 
Before explaining what a qualified certificate according to Art. 2 (10) ESD and Section 3 No. 2 
ESA is, it is necessary to explain the use of a certificate in a public key infrastructure.  
3.2.1 Certificate acc. to Art. 2 (9) ESD and Section 3 No. 9 ESA 
 A certificate is defined in Art. 2 (9) ESD and Section 3 No. 9 ESA as a link between signature 
verification data and the signatory which confirms the signatory's identity and is signed by the 
issuer of the certificate. Related to a public key infrastructure that means the pair of keys is 
linked to a natural or legal person or to an entity.
72
 It answers the question how can someone 
know which two keys belong together and to whom? In a small community the keys might be 
passed to each other on a storage device, e.g. a USB stick. But digital signatures should ensure 
identification, authentication and data integrity in transactions between people who might have 
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never met each other, e.g. via Internet. A physical exchange of storage devices is obviously not 
possible between them. The receiver of a message might identify the private key which belongs 
to the public key but how can he figure out who owns the private key? A certificate works as a 
sort of an identity card and binds a public key and a person or entity and maybe other attributes 
together.
73
 With this binding everyone can find out who owns which pair of keys and can 
identify the sender of a message. This works only if it is possible to trust the certificate.
74
 If 
everyone can design ones own certificate a certificate is considered to be not trustworthy. 
Therefore the system of certificates requires a certification authority which signs the certificate 
after issuing it. The signature of the certification authority itself is signed by another certification 
authority. So a hierarchical structure of certification authorities is built and one can decide at 
which level one trusts the certification authority.  
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3.2.2 The requirements of Art. 2 (10) ESD/Section 4 ESA 
 A qualified certificate is not only an identification means as defined in Art. 2 (9) ESD and 
Section 4 ESA which links the signature-verification data to a person and that confirms the iden-
tity of that person. According to the definitions in Art. 2 (10) ESD and Section 4 S. 1 ESA, a 
qualified certificate has to meet the requirements laid down in Annex I ESD and in Section 4 
ESA and is provided by a certification-service-provider that fulfils the requirements laid down in 
Annex II and in Section 10 to 15 ESA.  
3.2.2.1 Information Requirement according to Annex I ESD/Section 4 ESA 
In Annex I ESD and Section 4 ESA information requirements have been laid down which a qua-
lified certificate has to be able to contain. Some of the information has to be part of the certifica-
te, some information has to be given the possibility to contain it.  
Necessary information according to Annex I ESD are  
 (a) an indication that the certificate is issued as a qualified certificate;  
 (b) the identification of the certification-service-provider and the State in which it is es-
tablished 
 (c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be identified as such; 
 (e) signature-verification data which correspond to signature-creation data under the con-
trol of the signatory; 
 (f) an indication of the beginning and end of the period of validity of the certificate; 
 (g) the identity code of the certificate; 
 (h) the advanced electronic signature of the certification-service-provider issuing it; 
 
Information the certificate should be able to contain according to Annex I ESD are  
 (d) provision for a specific attribute of the signatory to be included if relevant, depending 
on the purpose for which the certificate is intended; 
 (i) limitations on the scope of use of the certificate, if applicable; and 
 (j) limits on the value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, if applicable. 
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Additionally Section 4 ESA allows that further details of the content of qualified certificates may 
be given in regulations prescribed by the King
75
.  
Annex I ESD and Section 4 ESA lay down a minimum standard for the information a certificate 
has to contain
76
 as some information are obligatory. This should ensure a high level of trust and 
security regarding the correctness of the information contained because there are different types 
of certificates which contain different information and create therefore different levels of security 
and trustworthiness regarding the correctness of the information contained.
77
 These information 
do not secure for a third party security regarding to the procedure followed during the 
registration process and issuing of the certificate because the signature of the certification service 
provider does not reveal his compliance with the rules of Annex II ESD. For some information 
the certificate is open to contain them but they are not obligatory information. Annex I ESD and 
Section 4 ESA are not bound directly to a specific technology existing today.
78
 A common stan-
dard for certificates is the 509.x v3 standard.
79
 According to RFC 5280 a certificate has different 
fields which contain certain information. Roughly the fields are divided into three groups: the 
tbsCertificatefield, the signatureAlgorithmfield and the subject field.
80
 The three fields can be ca-
tegorised as that one which contains information about entities, one which contains information 
to identify the CA and one which contains information to control the correctness of the informa-
tion given about the subject and the CA.  
One group contains only information about the certificate. Another group of fields contains in-
formation about the issuer. A third group of fields contains information about the subject. The in-
formation a X.509 certificate must or can contain makes it eligible to be a qualified certificate 
according to Art. 2 (10) ESD and Section 4 ESA because it can fulfil the requirements of Annex 
I. The different requirements of Annex I are fulfilled by the three groups of different fields.  
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3.2.2.2 Is the definition of qualified certificate the same regarding the informational 
content? 
There is a minor difference between the definition of a qualified certificate between the ESA and 
the ESD. The ESA lays down the requirement that the certificate expires one day that the ESD 
does not have. It looks as if the ESA imposes stricter rules on qualified certificates than the ESD. 
But as Annex I letter f) says that the certificate has to give information about the beginning and 
the end of the period of validity that implies that the certificate expires one day. Therefore the 
definition of a qualified certificate regarding the information the certificate has to contain 
comply with each other. 
3.2.2.3 Comply stricter information rules for qualified certificates with Art. 5 ESD? 
 In Section 4 S. 3 ESA the Norwegian King is able to adapt the information requirements a 
certificate should include and can impose stricter rules for qualified certificates. The Norwegian 
King is allowed to use a „forskrift‟ which is defined in Section 2 Forvaltningsloven as a rule that 
applies to rights and duties for a not specified number or not specified group of people. As the 
requirements regarding the information a certificate should contain are minimum requirements, 
the King can in other regulations impose stricter rules about the information a qualified 
certificate should have. Therefore Section 4 S. 3 ESA complies with the ESD. 
3.2.2.4 Requirements the certification-service-provider has to fulfil 
The second half of the definition of Art. 2 (10) ESD and Section 4 S. 1 ESA say that the quali-
fied certificate which fulfils the requirements of Annex I has to be issued by a certification-ser-
vice provider who fulfils the requirements of Annex II respective Sections 10 to 15 in the ESA. 
According to Art. 2 (11) ESD and Section 3 No. 10 ESA a certification-service-provider is an en-
tity or a legal or natural person who issues certificates or provides other services related to 
electronic signatures. This means that certification-service-providers are not only those providers 
that  issue a certificate but are services which are related to issuing and administration of 
certificates
81
 which can be control of the identity of a signatory or the attribution of identifiable 
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names as well.
82
 That can be for example the running of a certificate revocation list, a registry 
service for all certificates which are issued, archiving, time stamping, issuing of certificates or 
giving advice in relation to electronic signatures.
83
 Giving advice in relation to electronic 
signatures can also mean giving advice regarding the acceptance of electronic signatures of an 
unknown certificate issuer.
84
 All the mentioned services which are related to the issuing of a 
certificate can be given by a single service provider or by a group of service providers which can 
be business partners or subcontractors.
85
 
The requirements which a certification-service-provider has to fulfil according to Annex II impo-
se duties on the certification-service-provider. These duties can be grouped into three groups: in-
formation duties, information security duties and organisational duties concerning the organisati-
on of the entity and the administration of the certificates. In detail the requirements of Annex II 
ESD can be grouped like this:  
The information security duties are  
 (f) Use trustworthy systems and products which are protected against modification and 
ensure the technical and cryptographic security of the process supported by them; 
 (g) Take measures against forgery of certificates, and, in cases where the certification-
service-provider generates signature creation data, guarantee confidentiality during the 
process of generating such data; 
 (i) Record all relevant information concerning a qualified certificate for an appropriate 
period of time, in particular for the purpose of providing evidence of certification for the 
purposes of legal proceedings. Such recording may be done electronically; 
 (j) Not store or copy signature-creation data of the person to whom the certification-ser-
vice-provider provided key management services; 
 (l) Use trustworthy systems to store certificates in a verifiable form so that: 
o certificates are publicly available for retrieval in only those cases for which the certi-
ficate-holder's consent has been obtained, (...) 
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These numbers contain the organisational duties concerning the organisation of the entity  
 (a) Demonstrate the reliability necessary for providing certification services; 
 (e) Employ personnel who possess the expert knowledge, experience, and qualifications 
necessary for the services provided, in particular competence at managerial level, experti-
se in electronic signature technology and familiarity with proper security procedures; 
they must also apply administrative and management procedures which are adequate and 
correspond to recognised standards; 
 (h) Maintain sufficient financial resources to operate in conformity with the requirements 
laid down in the Directive, in particular to bear the risk of liability for damages, for 
example, by obtaining appropriate insurance. 
 (l) Use trustworthy systems to store certificates in a verifiable form so that: 
o only authorised persons can make entries and changes, 
o information can be checked for authenticity, 
o any technical changes compromising these security requirements are apparent to 
the operator. 
 
The organisational duties concerning the administration of the certificates are defined in these 
points: 
 (b) Ensure the operation of a prompt and secure directory and a secure and immediate re-
vocation service; 
 (c) Ensure that the date and time when a certificate is issued or revoked can be determi-
ned precisely; 
 (d) Verify, by appropriate means in accordance with national law, the identity and, if 
applicable, any specific attributes of the person to which a qualified certificate is issued; 
 
The informational duty is laid down in  
 (k) Before entering into a contractual relationship with a person seeking a certificate to 
support his electronic signature inform that person by a durable means of communication 
of the precise terms and conditions regarding the use of the certificate, including any li-
26 
 
mitations on its use, the existence of a voluntary accreditation scheme and procedures for 
complaints and dispute settlement. Such information, which may be transmitted electroni-
cally, must be in writing and in readily understandable language. Relevant parts of this 
information must also be made available on request to third-parties relying on the certifi-
cate. 
 
If a certificate is issued by a certification-service-provider who fulfils all these duties laid down 
in Annex II ESD and in Section 10 to 15, a qualified certificate for the qualified signature has 
been created according to the definitions in Art. 2 (10) ESD and Section 4 S. 1 ESA.  
The fulfilment of the requirements of Annex II ESD is according to Art. 3 (3) ESD at the 
moment monitored by each Member State independently. Therefore each Member State sets up 
its own regulation how to decide which certification-service provider fulfils the duties laid down 
in Annex II ESD. At the moment the Commission is carrying out a study which concentrates on 
a supervision model for certificate service providers which issue qualified certificates.
86
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3.2.2.5 Requirements for certificate-service-providers comply with the requirements of 
Annex II 
Within the requirements a certificate issuer has to fulfil the ESA has not implemented all 
requirements laid down in Annex II ESD.  
3.2.2.5.1 Letter l) Annex II ESD not implemented 
 The part of letter l) of the Annex II ESD according to which only qualified persons can make 
changes and entries into the certificate is missing. The government says that Annex II letter l) is 
not implemented into Norwegian Law because it is a requirement which is not needed in a public 
key infrastructure.
87
 It is not possible in a public key infrastructure to change a certificate 
because a change of the content of a certificate means a withdrawal.
88
 Such a change in the 
certificate makes it not valid according to RFC 5280 because one cannot see who has changed 
the content of the certificate. That causes doubts about the correctness of the content of the 
certificate and therefore causes doubts in the validity and trustworthiness of a certificate. The 
problem with this argumentation is that it shows how tight the law is fitted towards a PKI-
structure whereas the Directive
89
 and the ESA should be neutral towards a certain technology.
90
  
On the other hand there does not seem to be many alternatives to a PKI because it is the state-at-
art technology. It was argued that requirement l) of Annex II ESD should be implemented into 
Norwegian law to take into consideration a further technological development.  
3.2.2.5.2 Letter e) Annex II ESD not implemented 
What seems to be missing is letter e) of Annex II. Letter e) of Annex II ESD sets up 
requirements regarding the personnel a certificate issuer has to employ. This is an organisational 
matter. Section 10 S. 1 ESA deals with necessary law related, organisational, technological 
issues.
91
 To be able to provide a secure and well functioning certification service this includes 
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dispositions related to personnel, operating and security.
92
 This is indicated by „manage their 
activities in a responsible manner‟ because the necessary dispositions to fulfil these requirements 
are to employ personnel who have the necessary expertise, knowledge, experience and 
qualification for the jobs.
93
 This includes that the personnel are familiarised with electronic 
signatures technology as well as with proper security procedures.
94
 Therefore letter e) Annex II 
ESD is implemented within the ESA. 
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3.3 Created by a secure-signature-creation device 
The qualified signature has to be created by a secure-signature-creation device. A secure-signa-
ture-creation device is defined in Art. 2 (6) ESD and Section 8 ESA as a signature-creation de-
vice which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III respective Section 8 ESA. 
3.3.1 Signature-creation-device 
In Art. 2 (5) ESD and in Section 3 No. 6 ESA a signature-creation device is defined as configu-
red software or hardware used to implement the signature-creation data which is defined in Art. 2 
(4) ESD and Section 3 No. 5 ESA as unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys, 
which are used by the signatory to create an electronic signature. A signature-creation data can 
be the pair of keys or just the private key in a PKI-Infrastructure.
95
 The signature-creation device 
is the medium the key in a PKI-Infrastructure is stored on.
96
 This can be for example a smart 
card, which is often used.  
3.3.2 Secure-signature creation device 
To be a secure-signature-creation device the signature-creation device must fulfil the 
requirements of Annex III and Section 8 ESA, which are 
 1. Secure-signature-creation devices must, by appropriate technical and procedural 
means, ensure at the least that: 
o (a) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can practically occur 
only once, and that their secrecy is reasonably assured; 
o (b) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation cannot, with 
reasonable assurance, be derived and the signature is protected against forgery 
using currently available technology; 
o (c) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can be reliably 
protected by the legitimate signatory against the use of others. 
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 2. Secure signature-creation devices must not alter the data to be signed or prevent such 
data from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature process. 
 
The Annex III/Section 8 requirements deal only with protection issues of the signature-creation 
data. Which technologies are in line with the requirements of Annex III/Section 8 is according to 
Art. 3 (4) ESD determined by an appropriate public or private body which is designated by the 
Member States. That body is a national body of a Member State which is established according 
to the criteria laid down in Commission Decision 2000/709/EC. Section 9 ESA rules the creation 
of that national body in Norway.  Section 9 ESA says:  
“Approval as a secure signature creation device, cf. Section 8, is given by the body 
appointed by the King. The King may in regulations lay down more detailed provisions 
on that body and on requirements for secure signature creation devices. 
Approval from a corresponding body in another State which is a party to the EEA 
Agreement shall be considered equivalent to approval under the above paragraph. 
The requirements in Section 8 shall be considered to have been met when the hardware or 
software used conforms to the standards for electronic signature products which the 
European Commission lays down and which are published in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities.” 
 The signature-creation device fulfils these requirements if it complies with the standards laid 
down by the EU-Commission or a national body according to Section 9 S. 3 ESA.
97
 The King 
appointed a national body in Norway which certifies the security of IT-devices in accordance 
with Section 9 S. 1 ESA in Norway Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet (NSM).
98
 NSM certifies 
according to the Common Criteria.
99
 These requirements are part of a CWA which contains 
Protection Profiles
100
 on which in a CEN Workshop it was agreed upon certain technical 
standards which fulfil EAL 4.
101
 It should replace the expired reference number CWA 14167-1 
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and CWA 14167-2 in 2003
102
 of Commission decision in 2003 C(2003) 2439. These profiles do 
not cover the entire system environment in which secure signature-creation devices
103
 operate 
because the requirements of Annex III should only ensure functionality of advanced electronic 
signatures.
104 
 The CWA states that there are different guidelines for the implementation of 
secure-signature-creation devices on different platforms.
105
 They recognized three different types 
of secure-signature-creation devices.
106
 Type one generates the signature-creation-data or the 
signature-verification-data.
107
 This type can be a smartcard with a small microprocessor on it 
which is capable of generating the signature or verifying of the signatures.
108
  Type two stores 
the signature-creation-data and creates the signature and needs a secure communication channel 
with a Type one device to gain the signature-creation-data.
109
 This type can be a smart card  
which only stores information on its chip.
110
 Type three can be described as a combination of 
type two and type one device because it generates the signature-creation-data and stores the 
signature-verification-data.
111
 For this type is often a microprocessor smartcard used which chip 
is capable of calculating the algorithm for the signature-generation.
112
 An approved secure-
signature-creation device consists of a signature-creation device which means software or 
hardware used to create electronic signatures with the help of signature-creation data.  
The existing technology is tested and approved by a national body established according to Art. 3 
IV ESD. Technology that is approved by such a body fulfils the requirements of Annex III 
ESD/Section 8 ESA. So every system that is said to fulfil those requirements is a secure-
signature creation device. 
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3.3.3 Does an approved secure signature-creation device fulfil the requirements of 
Annex III? 
The requirements Section 8 ESA lays down for a secure signature-creation device comply with 
the definition of a signature-creation device and the requirements of Annex III ESD. The only 
difference seems to be that the secure signature-creation device has to be approved according to 
Norwegian law but the Directive has laid down that requirement not in the definition of a secure 
signature-creation device but in Art. 3 (4) ESD. Art. 3 (4) ESD says that the conformity of a 
signature-creation device with the requirements of Annex III ESD should be approved by an 
appropriate body the Member State designates according to the procedure laid down in Art. 9 
ESD. Therefore the definition of an approved secure signature-creation device is in line with the 
definition of the Directive. 
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3.3.4 Are the protection profiles of the common criteria page accepted in Norway? 
The Norwegian NSM certifies signature-creation devices according to the rules of Common 
Criteria.
113
 The rules for secure signature-creation devices have been laid down in Protection 
Profiles which can be found on the HP of the Common Criteria.
114
 Protection Profiles are 
accepted for secure-signature creation devices in Norway because these are international 
standards which are laid down as well in the CWA 14169. 
3.4 Are there the same requirements for a qualified signature? 
Qualified signatures in the Directive are according to Art. 5 S. 1 advanced electronic signatures 
which are based on a qualified certificate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation 
device. That is the same definition as in Section 3 3. ESA which says that a qualified signature is 
an advanced electronic signature which is based on a qualified certificate and created by an 
approved secure-signature creation device. This sounds as if the requirements for a qualified 
signature are congruent but there might be differences in the details. Therefore I will have a 
closer look at the differences in the details of the definitions. 
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4 Legal consequences for a qualified signature 
In both laws the qualified signature is granted the same legal recognition like handwritten 
signatures.  
4.1 Art. 5 I ESD 
Art. 5 I ESD gives equivalence to a qualified signature in that way that it takes the handwritten 
signature as a reference point for what an electronic signature should be.
115
  
4.1.1 Satisfy the legal requirements of a signature – Art. 5 ESD  
The term „legal requirement' in Art. 5 ESD means every requirement which is set up for a 
signature in a legal rule. This can be for example the requirement „handwritten‟ for the signature 
in a will in Section 2247 BGB.  
4.1.2 Qualified signature in relation to electronic data equals handwritten signature in 
relation to paper-based data – Art. 5 ESD 
A paper-based document, combined with a handwritten signature, is assumed to be authentic in a 
very secure way.
116
 Although that is not true because it is very easy to falsify a handwritten 
signature, the handwritten signature is a well-known and accepted authentication means.
117
 The 
handwritten signature has gained a symbolic character and represents today the means of 
authentication which provides a high level of legal certainty.
118
  
An electronic document needs authentication in the same way as a paper-based document. A 
technology is presumed to fulfil the same functions as a handwritten signature if it fulfils these 8 
authentication characteristics: data origin authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, link between 
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the authentication tool and the content, difficult to forge, easy to verify, verifiable as long as the 
legal act is of legal importance and allows entity authentication.
119
 The technological description 
the Directive points at is a digital signature that is based on asymmetrical encryption. That 
technology helps to authenticate the origin of the data, shows the non-repudiation of the 
document and guarantees the integrity of the document. It links the authentication tool with the 
content because the data to calculate the signature is partly originating from the signed 
document. It is difficult to forge because it uses some complex mathematical calculations while 
it is easy to verify with the public key of the sender as long as the legal act is of legal importance 
because the certificate can be remain retrievable as long as the digital signature is needed.
120
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4.1.3 Legal effect and admissibility as evidence 
The question arises if a qualified signature is admissible as evidence because there is no extra 
regulation for that in the civil procedure law or in the ESA. The principle of free giving of 
evidence allows parties to give as evidence what they think is necessary. Therefore qualified 
signatures are admissible as evidence under this principle; this means in civil procedure law a 
qualified signature is admissible as evidence. 
4.2 Section 6 S. 1 ESA 
The reference point for a qualified signature is also a handwritten signature.  
4.2.1 Contains signatures – Every rule concerning legal effects of a signature 
Section 6 S. 1 ESA only concerns rules that requires a signature as formal requirements. The 
signature has different functions. The functions a signature can have are different and the degree 
of importance can be varying.
121
 A signature can have evidential functions, cautionary functions, 
protective functions, channelling functions and record keeping functions. Within the evidential 
functions primary and secondary evidential functions are distinguished.
122
 The primary purpose 
of a signature serves to provide admissible and reliable evidence to the following 3 elements: the 
signatory approves and adopts the contents of the document and thereby agrees that the content 
of the document is binding upon them and has legal effect.
123
 The signature reminds the 
signatory about the significance of the act and the need to act within the provisions of the 
document.
124
 As secondary evidential functions a signature is capable of providing identification 
and proof of the authentication of a person‟s identity, the identity of a particular characteristic, 
attribute, status of a person, e.g. the status as a company director.
125
 The cautionary function 
means that the signatory should take care before committing themselves to the contents of the 
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document.
126
 The protective function is related to the cautionary function. This function gives the 
receiving party some security that the other party affirms the content of the document and they 
have given their full attention to the content of the document.
127
 The channelling function means 
that the signature helps to clarify the point at which a person recognises the act has become 
legally significant.
128
 The record keeping function means that a document which is manifested in 
a physical format serves as a durable record of the terms of an agreement.
129
 This shows that 
different laws appoint to handwritten signatures more functions than those information security 
purposes appoints to them.  
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4.2.2 In order to obtain a specific legal effect  
The use of a signature should have a legal consequence. For example in Germany a will shall  
not be valid until it is signed says Section 2247 I BGB if it is not testified by a notary.
130
 In 
general a signature can be used for authentication and identification.
131
 But in connection of the 
requirement of a written form it can also function as a warning and information
132
 because if 
someone has to put his signature under a document this warns him that he is doing something 
which binds him. These functions one usually finds in the law. If one takes the example of 
Section 2247 BGB the signature has got the function to identify and authenticate the person who 
wrote that will.  
4.2.3 Provision may be implemented electronically 
With the provision is meant every rule which binds a legal effect to a signature. These provisions 
should be capable of being used in an electronic environment. That means that there must be a 
legal possibility to communicate electronically within the actual area of law, otherwise Section 6 
S. 1 is not applicable.
133
 This border is implemented because there are rules which cannot be 
implemented electronically.
134
 The example with Section 2247 BGB is not a usable example here 
because Section 2247 BGB requires a handwritten will with a handwritten signature which is not 
possible in an electronic environment as electronic wills seem in general not to be accepted.
135
 
Without this border Section 6 S. 1 ESA will apply wider as it should be and is wished.
136
 In 
relation to electronic signatures an electronic environment means a means of electronic 
communications, e.g. via e-mail, via Instant Messenger Services or via other electronic 
communications means.  
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4.2.4 Consequence for the qualified signature 
If a qualified signature fulfils all the above mentioned requirements the requirements set up for 
the signature apply for the qualified signature as well. Section 6 S. 1 ESA gives therefore the 
same legal recognition to qualified signatures like handwritten signatures
137
 because they are 
given the same legal consequence as a handwritten signature if the rule concerning the 
requirement of a signature can be implemented electronically. 
5 Art. 5 II ESD/ Section 6 S. 2 ESA 
Both second parts of the two laws set up rules for the legal recognition of an electronic signature 
as defined in Art. 2 (a) ESD/ Section 3 1. ESA. Both laws define the electronic signature as data 
in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and 
which serve as a method of authentication.  
5.1 Art. 5 II ESD 
Art. 5 II ESD is a non-discrimination rule for electronic-signatures. An electronic signature is 
according to the definition in Art. 2 (1) ESD data in electronic form which are attached to or 
logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication. 
This definition gives the term electronic signature a wide meaning because it means every data 
which identifies and authenticates.
138
 That can be as simple as signing a message with a person‟s 
name
139
 or a picture of a handwritten signature.
140
 Some disagree with the concept that a typed 
name under an E-Mail or a scanned handwritten-signature can serve as a signature because an 
electronic document differs in its nature from a paper document.
141
 To serve the functions of the 
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above mentioned authentication definition electronic documents must have a special relation 
with each other because it is necessary that they are connected with each other electronically. 
This means that a series of electronic impulses have to be connected with another series of 
electronic impulses in a way that changes can be detected. A name tag or a scanned handwritten-
signature do not provide such an electronic connection. This premise speaks against those who 
consider a typed name under an E-Mail or a scanned handwritten-signature as an electronic 
signature. But it is socially more common to assign electronic forms the same functions as paper 
forms. A lot of people who use electronic forms tend to give them a social meaning to that what 
they can observe about the electronic impulses.  For example, people take the displayed form of 
an electronic document as the document and „translate‟ what they see into known social 
functions. Therefore some say that a typed name under an E-Mail or a scanned handwritten 
signature are able to fulfil the concept of an electronic signature because they see a similar 
format to the paper format. I think that a name tag under an E-mail can be a signature because 
ESD and ESA have got different levels of signatures which are attached to different sorts of 
technologies on different sophisticated levels. The basic form is not attached to specific 
technology unlike the two more sophisticated forms of electronic signatures in both laws. The 
point that illustrates this motivation is that the social understanding gives the handwritten 
signature the concept it has today. The law should leave room to develop a social understanding 
of electronic forms. This is only possible if there is no further technological premise connected to 
the basic form of an electronic signature.   
Art. 5 II ESD gives four reasons on which an electronic signature cannot be denied legal 
effectiveness and admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings. The reasons are 
 In electronic form 
 Not based upon a qualified certificate 
 Not based upon a qualified certificate issued by an accredited certification-service-
provider  
 Not created by a secure signature creation device.  
43 
 
Basically Art. 5 II ESD means that an electronic signature does not have to be a qualified 
signature to gain legal recognition.
142
  
The question occurs if the non-discrimination rule only applies to electronic signatures as 
defined in Art. 2 (1) ESD and not to advanced electronic signatures as defined in Art. 2 (2) ESD. 
This would lead to the result that it would be compliant with Art. 5 II ESD to discriminate an 
advanced electronic signature. One can argue that there are two different definitions in Art. 2 
ESD which means that both forms of electronic signatures are two different things. If one takes 
the technical background of the different electronic signature one can definitely say that both 
definitions mean different things. But as the Directive takes a technically neutral approach
143
 
towards electronic signatures different techniques which form the background of the definitions 
are not relevant for the question. Art. 5 II ESD sounds like a basic rule for legal recognition of 
electronic signatures.
144
 The definition of Art. 5 II ESD is wide and contains the definition of 
Art. 2 (2) ESD because Art. 2(2) ESD only describes a certain technology which is used to 
identify and authenticate a person. Therefore the non-discrimination rule gives legal recognition 
to all sorts of electronic signatures. The simplest methods such as a name, initials, a pseudonym, 
scanned handwritten signature under an electronic document
145
 to provide an electronic signature 
fall under the definition of Art. 2 (1) ESD.
146
 They provide a very low level of assurance to the 
identity and the authenticity of an individual.
147
  
5.2 Section 6 ESA  
Section 6 S. 2 ESA says that an electronic signature which is not a qualified signature can fulfil 
the requirements for a rule which lays down a signature as a requirement. This means that an 
electronic signature which is not a qualified signature can be equivalent to a handwritten 
signature
148
 but this is not a necessity. The question if an electronic signature fulfils the formal 
requirements to gain equivalence to a handwritten signature depends on the type of electronic 
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signature.
149
 It may be possible that an electronic signature must not be equivalent to a 
handwritten signature but is eligible as evidence because it proves beyond doubt a certain fact, 
e.g. an electronic timestamp proves when a document has arrived and can therefore be used as a 
piece of evidence if a deadline is held or not. Section 6 S. 2 ESA gives the respective electronic 
signature that content as piece of evidence which serves the function of the electronic signature 
best. Therefore the approach is highly flexible. 
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5.3 Does the non-discrimination rule results from normal Norwegian law? 
If one compares Art. 5 II ESD and Section 6 ESA, it is obvious that the non-discrimination rule 
of Art. 5 II ESD is missing. The question is if that is a breach of the EEA-Agreement. There is a 
breach of the EEA-Agreement if the non-discrimination rule has to be transferred into 
Norwegian law. As Art 5 ESD is a central part of the signature it is very important to implement 
the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD into Norwegian law.
150
  It belongs to the mandatory 
part of the Directive.
151
 Therefore it must be implemented into Norwegian Law. But it is not 
necessary to implement the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD, if the non-discrimination 
rule is already part of Norwegian law. Then an incorrect implementation of the ESD does not 
exist and the EEA-Agreement is not breached. In its reasoning the Norwegian government 
argued that the non-discrimination rule is already part of the Norwegian law.
152
 The principle of 
free giving of evidence and the free consideration of evidence means that an electronic signature 
is admissible as evidence before court, no matter if it is a qualified signature or not.
153
 The non-
discrimination rule is regulating the legal effectiveness and the admissibility as piece of evidence 
of an electronic signature.   
5.3.1 Legal effectiveness of an electronic signature 
The legal effectiveness of an electronic signature is implemented in the second sentence of 
Section 6 ESA because it says that an electronic signature can meet the same requirements as a 
qualified signature and has therefore the same legal recognition. The legal effectiveness of an 
electronic signature means any legal consequence an electronic signature is given. This can be 
the possibility to conclude legal valid agreements between private parties, the acceptance of 
electronically signed documents between private parties or in all kinds of administrative 
procedures or the evidence electronic signatures can give in court litigation.
154
 But Section 6 S. 2 
ESA concerns just the highest level of the legal recognition an electronic signature can get, not 
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the bottom line of legal effectiveness.
155
 It gives the judge a wide guideline what function an 
electronic signature can serve. The second sentence of Section 6 ESA says that an electronic 
signature can have the same effect as a handwritten signature and limits the legal recognition of 
an electronic signature to this point. This is the same with Art. 5 ESD rules because Art. 5 II 
ESD does not give a presumption what functions an electronic signature can serve. Therefore an 
electronic signature can have the same legal recognition as a handwritten signature. But this 
probable equivalence of an electronic signature does not necessarily mean that an electronic 
signature cannot be discriminated because it is electronic, not based upon a qualified certificate, 
not based upon a qualified certificate by an accredited certification-service-provider or not 
created by a secure signature-creation-device. This minimal legal recognition seems to be 
missing for the legal effectiveness in Section 6 ESA.  
The principle of free consideration of evidence does not cover all parts of the legal effectiveness 
of an electronic signature. There are other areas except the consideration as evidence before 
court where the legal effectiveness of an electronic signature can be important. For example can 
an electronic signature verify the authenticity in electronic communication between a citizen and 
a township. If the township does not recognize an electronic signature as valid because it is 
electronic or because it does not fulfil the requirements of a qualified signature although a 
handwritten signature would be not necessary within the communication process the electronic 
signature would be discriminated. Legal effectiveness is as well granted if a legislator gives a 
certain legal consequence to an electronic signature.  
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5.3.1.1 Legal effectiveness found in the principle of free consideration of evidence 
Section 21-2 (1) Tvisteloven says that a judge can consider freely the given evidence. The 
consideration is based according to Section 21-2 (2) Tvisteloven on that what is found as factual 
circumstances. The principle of free consideration includes that the judge‟s consideration is 
neither bound by how much weight certain evidence should attached to
156
 nor bound to the 
party‟s argumentation about a question of evidence,157 which is ruled explicitly in Section 11-2 
S. 3 Tvisteloven. The question is if the principle of free consideration of evidence gives the judge 
the possibility to reject an electronic signature because of the reasons which are forbidden 
according to the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 ESD. The free consideration of evidence has 
consequences for what the electronic signature proves. In the case of an electronic signature this 
means more or less if the electronic signature proofs the integrity of the electronic 
communication and the authenticity of the sender of the document.
158
 What this means in a 
single case is dependant of different considerations made by the circumstances how the 
electronic signature is used. This means according to the ESD it is correct to consider the 
authentication of the non-qualified signature on a lower level if the signature is not qualified 
according to Art. 5 I ESD/ Section 6 S. 1 ESA because the authentication a qualified signature 
gives is equalised with a handwritten signature. Both rules allow the possibility that a judge can 
deny a legal effect of an electronic signature. The non-discrimination rule expects from a judge 
that a denial of an electronic signature is based on an affirmative finding, e.g. lack of technology 
reliability or accountability. 
159
 But the consideration of evidence should be complete, thorough 
and efficient.
160
  A thorough consideration of an electronic signature as evidence might not be a 
denial of a legal effect of an electronic signature just because it is electronic or does not fulfil the 
requirements of a qualified certificate. The principle of free consideration of evidence makes it 
unlikely that a judge denies the legal effect out of the forbidden reasons of Art. 5 II ESD because 
these reasons are build on a general argument. Such an argument Art. 5 II ESD wants to hinder 
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because a denial of legal effects should be based on an evaluation and should be sufficiently 
reasoned.
161
 But an unlikelihood is not the certainty a non-discrimination rule would give. The 
possibility is still there that a judge considers the denial of legal effect of an electronic signature 
because it is electronic or it does not fulfil the requirements of a qualified signature to be 
thorough, efficient and complete in a case.  
 The principle of free considering of evidence is not written down in the Straffeprosessloven but 
it is considered to be such a general rule in Norwegian evidence law that it can be erased.
162
 
There are the same rules used as in the Tvisteloven. Therefore the conclusion for electronic 
signatures in a criminal law case before court is the same: The judge might consider an argument 
as sufficient consideration that is forbidden according to Art. 5 II ESD. This result might be 
improbable but because the judge decides if he considers a general argumentation as sufficient 
enough to deny electronic signatures legal recognition, such a result is possible. 
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5.3.1.2 Legal effectiveness found in other areas  
Regarding the legal effect an electronic signature has outside of courts the non-discrimination 
rule of Art. 5 II ESD has to be taken into account as well.
163
 This means that a legislator or 
another state institution can deny the legal effect of an electronic signature as defined in Art. 2 a) 
ESD/ Section 3 1. ESA only sufficiently reasoned and based on an evaluation
164
. As Section 6 S. 
2 ESA applies to legal effects of electronic signatures outside of courts as well this means that 
such an institution can give an electronic signature the same legal effect as a handwritten 
signature. However as the principle of free consideration of evidence is only binding courts 
Section 6 S. 2 ESA might allow a general discrimination of an electronic signature because it is 
not a qualified signature or because of its electronic form. But if the non-discrimination rule can 
be implemented in another way such discrimination is hindered. If in a law the use of an 
electronic form with an electronic signature is allowed it is impossible to reject an electronic 
signature because it is not fulfilling the requirements of Art. 5 I ESD or electronic. The 
Norwegian government has done this: for example it uses a general understanding for document 
in Section 3 Offentlighetsloven and Section 2 f) Forvaltningsloven which is not bound to paper 
and it expanded the meaning of written in that way that written implies also an electronic 
message. In this point Section 6 S. 2 ESA does comply with the Art. 5 2 ESD.  
But one has to take into account that a legislator can consider in a legislative act that an 
electronic signature is denied a legal effect because of its electronic format or its non-qualified 
nature
165
. This effect is reduced by general form rules such as Section 3 Offentlighetsloven and 
Section 2 f) Forvaltningsloven because the equivalence between written and electronic form 
these provisions give complicates such rules. But these rules does not hinder exemptions from 
the mentioned rules. Therefore Section 6 S. 2 ESA does not comply with Art. 5 2 ESD.   
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5.3.2 Admissibility as evidence 
The question is if the non-compliance of the non-discrimination rule into Norwegian law opens 
the door for judges to reject an electronic signature as evidence which is not a qualified signature 
because it is electronic, not based upon a qualified certificate, not based upon a qualified 
certificate by an accredited certification-service-provider or not created by a secure signature-
creation device. As it would be too far fetched within this thesis to give a detailed overview over 
the whole Norwegian law concerning evidence before different sorts of courts only the general 
rules concerning the admissibility of evidence of the Tvisteloven, which is the civil procedures 
law and of the Straffeprosessloven, which is the criminal procedures law will be mentioned. This 
will be sufficient as an overview because there seems to be an incorrect implementation through 
the missing non-discrimination rule. 
If a judge considers evidence he has to accept it as evidence first. Therefore he cannot reject an 
electronic signature as admissible because it is electronic or does not fulfil the technical 
requirements of a qualified signature. He can though reject the argument of the party what the 
electronic signature should prove.  
Section 21-3 Tvisteloven regulates what is admissible as evidence. In Section 21-3 (1) 
Tvisteloven the parties have the right to give evidence as they wish except for the exemptions 
made in the Tvisteloven and the exemptions that result from §§ 21-7, 21-8 and chapter 22 
Tvisteloven. The principles of free consideration of evidence and free giving of evidence are 
linked together.
166
 But there is only an incorrect implementation of the ESD if the principle of 
free giving of evidence opens the possibility for a judge to reject an electronic signature as 
evidence because of the reasons laid down in Art. 5 II ESD. If the parties have according to 
Section 21-3 Tvisteloven the possibility to admit as evidence what they wish, there seems to be 
no possibility of a rejection of the judge due to the „forbidden‟ reasons of Art. 5 II ESD. The 
problem is that the law as such makes exemptions from this rule and these exemptions are 
extensive.
167
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Section 21-7, Section 21-8 and Section 9-16 (II) Tvisteloven deal with general exemption for the 
admissibility of evidence due to process economical reasons. These exemptions are concerned 
with denial of evidence which is not necessary for the case, which has just a small meaning for 
the case, which is not adequate for the case or which is brought forward to late. A denial of 
admissibility founded on these reasons is not related to the reasons of Art. 5 II ESD. Chapter 22 
Tvisteloven contains prohibitions of taking evidence due to disclosed information in Sections 22-
1 to 22-8 Tvisteloven and rights to refuse giving evidence in Sections 22-8 to 22-12 Tvisteloven. 
These limits do not fall under the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD either.  
Section 21-12 Tvisteloven gives in its second subsection denial for written documents from 
experts under certain conditions. These conditions have nothing to do with the quality of an 
electronic signature or its electronic nature, therefore this rule complies with the non-
discrimination rule. 
The Straffeprosessloven does not contain a special rule for the free giving of evidence. The 
principle of free giving of evidence is part of the Straffeprosessloven as well because there are 
only a few rules that lead to an inadmissibility of evidence.
168
 The starting point in Norwegian 
criminal procedure law is that the parties in a criminal law „investigation‟ can give that evidence 
they think is connected to the case.
169
 To evaluate which rules may prohibit this principle there 
must be distinguished between very general prohibition rules and rules which are made for 
special material of evidence. 
Again the Straffeprosessloven states in Section 292 S. 2 a - c Straffeprosessloven that evidence 
which has no relevance for the case. The regulation includes a general and a specific relevance 
for the fact that should be proofed. The reason of the prohibition of evidence is here not based on 
the electronic nature or the missing fulfilment of the requirements of a qualified certificate. 
Therefore this prohibition does comply with Art. 5 II ESD. The same result can be found for the 
rules in Sections 293 and 295 Straffeprosessloven because these rules prohibit the giving of 
evidence because they are based on process economic reasons and are not able to interfere with 
the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD. 
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Section 92 and 136 Straffeprosessloven comply with Art. 5 II ESD because they deal with 
methods to get a statement from a witness or the defendant.  
The same is valid for Sections 117 to 120, 134, 301 Straffeprosessloven because they deal with 
statements of witnesses before court or during the investigation. Usually are there no electronic 
signatures used.  
The rule that illegal obtained evidence
170
 complies with Art. 5 II ESD because the reason for the 
rejection of evidence in this Section is the illegal way the evidence was obtained.  
Section 302 Straffeprosessloven applies to written documents. Usually electronic documents are 
not understood as written documents. Therefore Section 302 Straffeprosessloven does not apply 
to electronic signatures related to electronic documents. To fulfil the principle of speech acc. to 
Section 278 Straffeprosessloven the electronic document and electronic signature must be 
presented in some way before court.  
There are certain prohibitions for certain evidence. To see if this prohibition applies to an 
electronic signature, it must be evaluated what sort of evidence an electronic signature is. In the 
Straffeprosessloven there is evidence called gransking, which is an examination of evidence. 
This means every real thing as evidence, for example tissues, documents or pictures.
171
 As these 
regulations apply to everything, they could apply to electronic documents and especially to 
electronic signatures. The problem is what „real‟ means. Does it only mean concrete things, such 
as paper, tissues or goes the meaning of „real‟ further because usually there is a distinction 
between a „real‟ world and a „virtual‟, often meant electronic, world. Because an electronic 
signature is something not concrete, not touchable, one could say it is not real evidence. The 
problem which occurs now is what evidence is an electronic signature then if it does not fall 
under gransking? That result would lead to a discrimination of electronic signatures. Therefore 
electronic signatures and electronic documents would be discriminated as evidence because they 
are electronic. This interpretation would not comply with Art. 5 II ESD.  Another point to think 
about is if a document, written or electronic, is given as evidence, usually the content is 
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important. Without doubt written documents fall under this rule. In an electronic document the 
content is as important as it is in a written document. Therefore electronic documents and 
electronic signatures fall under the special rules of gransking. That means that there is no 
discrimination of an electronic signature as admissible evidence. 
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6 Why does the Directive apply to Norway?  
The EEA Agreement says in Art. 7 (b) EEA-Agreement that acts which are referred to or 
contained in the Annexes of the Agreement or in decisions of the EEA Joint Committee should 
be implemented into the internal legal order of a contractor of the Agreement if the act is 
corresponding to an EEC Directive in a form chosen by the authorities of the Contracting Parties. 
Norway is a Member of the EEA. Annex XI No. 5l EEA Agreement contains the ESD. The 
EEA-Agreement was implemented into Norwegian Law through the EØS-Loven in 1992. 
Section 1 EØS-Loven requires that the main part of the EEA-Agreement is part of the 
Norwegian Law. Therefore the ESD has to be implemented according to Art. 7 b) EEA 
Agreement into Norwegian Law. As there is a core part missing in the ESA, the non-
discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD, the question arises how a directive applies in an EEA-
Member if it is not fully implemented.  
6.1 Direct application of the Directive based on legislation/contract 
Section 2 EØS-Loven sets up a rule of precedence if the EEA-Law and the national are opposite 
to each other.
172
 This rule does not apply with the Directive because national law does not clash 
with EEA-Law but EEA-Law is not implemented correctly into Norwegian law. 
The EEA-Contract does not contain a rule what consequences are following if EEA-Law is not 
or not correctly implemented.
173
 
6.2 Direct application of the Directive based on EEA-Law 
The two leading cases which help to discuss this problem with regard to Norwegian Law are the 
Finanger Cases of the Norwegian Supreme Court.
174
 According to these two decisions the 
question is not answered easily and clearly. The main problem is, if the EEA-Law has horizontal 
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effect in the Norwegian Law or not if EEA-Law was not implemented correctly. The Finanger I 
decision was not unanimous. The Norwegian Supreme Court denied a direct application of a 
Directive because the horizontal effect infringes the intergovernmental character of the EEA-
agreement.
175
 The main reasoning is that Art. 7 EEA-Agreement states that a Directive has to be 
implemented into Norwegian Law by Norwegian authorities.
176
 This means that a Directive has 
no horizontal effect in Norwegian law in general.
177
 A dissenting opinion came to the conclusion 
that the Directives have horizontal effect, because there is no difference how far the Directives 
reach in EU and EEA-Law.
178
 The incorrect implementation of the EEA-Law can be corrected 
by the interpretation of the court because the legislator wanted to fulfil his obligation of the 
EEA-contract when he implemented the Directive.
179
 But the judges have to show some respect 
towards the intentions of the legislator when he implemented a Directive in the way he did.
180
 
The Directives can only be an aspect in the interpretation of a Norwegian Law based on a 
Directive because the EEA-agreement and the „presumsjonsprinsippet‟ require an interpretation 
that complies with the Directive.
181
 A breach of international public law must be hindered.
182
 
This means that a court might ignore national law.
183
 This interpretation is necessary as EEA 
members have the duty to show loyalty towards the EEA-Agreement and its rules.
184
 This loyalty 
duty is accompanied by the principle of the homogeneity of law within the EU.
185
 With this 
reasoning the first argumentation cannot deny the direct effect of Directives in Norway.
186
  But 
the general difference between the EU and the EEA is that it is an agreement between the EU 
and the EFTA States. The EFTA was thought to be an opposite model about economic 
cooperation between European States.
187
 There are no supranational organs because the EFTA is 
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thought to be an intergovernmental cooperation
188
 not a supranational bundle of states like the 
EU. This difference explains according to the reasoning of Finanger I why there is no horizontal 
effect of a Directive if it is not implemented correctly.
189
 The judgement says that a horizontal 
effect of a Directive in Norway would go beyond the scope of the interpretation according to 
Directives in EU-Law.
190
 Therefore it is the task of the legislator to react if a Directive is not 
implemented correctly.
191
 There is no reason for a court to use the rule of direct conform 
interpretation or the „presumsjonsprinsippet‟ to interpret away a clear rule in national law192 
although the judges should use all methods of interpretation to avoid a breach of international 
public law.
193
 The EEA-Agreement did not take over the principle of precedence as it is found in 
EU-Law.
194
 Another result in this question would mean a legal uncertainty for ordinary people 
because they cannot rely on the national law.
195
 This shows that foreseeability and conversion 
has to be considered in this question as well.
196
  The predictability is quite complex and put 
together from different legal sources because the EEA is according to the Sveinsbjørnsdottir-case 
a distinct legal order of its own.
197
 The EU-Directives are partly interpreted from other legal 
sources than that ones used in Norway.
198
 In Norway these interpretations are binding
199
 which 
can be found in the decisions of the ECJ. Therefore the EEA-Members had to take over the rule 
that if a national rule is in conflict with implemented EEA-Law or other laws it has to be 
implemented a regulation in the law that the EEA- Law is prioritised.
200
  
6.3 State Liability based on the EEA-Agreement 
The Norwegian Supreme Court has given the state liability for the incorrect implementation of a 
Directive in the Finanger II Case. This decision was again not unanimous. In the Finanger Case 
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the Norwegian Supreme Court followed mainly the argumentation of the EFTA-Court.
201
 In the 
Sveinsbjørnsdottir case the EFTA court decided that a state can be held liable for an incorrect 
implementation of a Directive because of the homogeneity objective, the objective of 
establishing the right of individuals and economic operators to equal treatment and equal 
opportunities.
202
 The dissenting opinion argues that the state liability is inseparable from the 
fundamental principle of the direct effect in the European Communities.
203
 The principle of 
direct effect and State liability constitute complementary elements of the supranationality of 
Community law.
204
 This supranationality is not part of the EEA-Agreement
205
 because the EEA-
Agreement was thought to be only an economical area.
206
  The homogeneity clause has two 
foundations in the EEA-agreement.
207
 On the one hand is the material provision of the EEA-
Agreement largely identical to corresponding provisions of the ECT or the ECSC.
208
 These 
provisions are incorporated into the national law of the member state.
209
 On the other hand 
elaborates the EEA-Agreement mechanisms with a view to ensure a homogeneous interpretation 
and application of the incorporated material provisions.
210
 The reason for these mechanisms is 
given in Recital 4 and 15 of the EEA-Agreement. Art. 6 EEA-Agreement is part of the 
mechanisms that should ensure homogeneity because it demands that those provisions of the 
EEA-Agreement which are in substance identical to that one of the EC Treaty and ECSC Treaty 
shall be interpreted according to the case law of the ECJ.
211
  Art. 105 and 106 EEA Agreement 
establish a Committee that keeps under constant review the case law of the ECJ and the EFTA 
Court.
212
 The objective to ensure individuals and economic operators equal treatment and equal 
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conditions of competition as well as an adequate means of enforcement requires a homogenous 
interpretation of EEA-Law.
213
  
Because of all this the EEA-Agreement is considered by the EFTA-Court to be an international 
treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own.
214
 As its scope goes beyond 
that what an agreement under international public law has, a Member State has to be hold liable 
for an incorrect implementation of a Directive.
215
 Although the EEA-Agreement is not as far 
reaching in its depth of integration
216
 and because of that the ECJ-Decision regarding the direct 
effect of directives is not applicable over Art. 6 EEA-Agreement
217
 because they are based on 
special characteristics of European Community legal order which are not part of the EEA-
Agreement,
218
 Directives cannot be applied directly within the EEA.
219
 Therefore the application 
of the principles for State liability as developed by the ECJ may not necessarily be in all respects 
coextensive.
220
 The state is only held liable according to EFTA-Court judgements if three 
requirements are fulfilled:  
 the Directive aims to give a subject individual rights221 
 there is an incorrect implementation which is sufficient serious222 
 the breach of EU/EEA Law causes a loss of an action223 
6.3.1 Individual right of a subject 
Within the ESD the first requirement is problematic because the Directive does not have effect 
between two private persons as it is not changing contract laws as the Directive states in Art. 1 
ESD.
224
 An individual right within the Directive might be the right to use an electronic signature 
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in the same way as a handwritten signature. That is the case when the relevant provision is 
unconditional and sufficiently precise.
225
 To determine this three points are to be considered:
226
 
 the identity of the persons entitled to the guarantee provided227 
 the content of that guarantee228 and  
 the identity of the person liable to provide the guarantee.229 
The non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD is a guarantee that electronic signatures are not 
discriminated out of the said reasons. It does not guarantee legal effectiveness as such but a 
minimal recognition for its legal effectiveness because an electronic signature cannot be held 
ineffective solely on the grounds that it is ineffective or does not fulfil the requirements of a 
qualified certificate.
230
  
The persons who is entitled to this guarantee is everyone who uses an electronic signature 
because Art.5 II ESD protects a user of an electronic signature because only a user of an 
electronic signature needs to know what legal effect an electronic signature has. Art. 5 II ESD is 
precise and unconditional enough for a court to determine if someone uses an electronic 
signature and therefore a court is enabled to determine whether or not a person should be 
regarded as a person to benefit under the directive. 
The person liable to provide that guarantee is the Member State as stated in Art. 5 II ESD 
because the Member State should install a legal system that makes it possible to use an electronic 
signature without the fear of rejection due to its electronic nature or non-fulfilment of a certain 
technology.  
Therefore the ESD provides an individual right.  
                                                 
225
 Efta Court, Case E-9/97, 66; E-4/01, 32; ECJ, Francovich, 11; ECJ, Brasserie du Pecheur, 21. 
226
 ECJ, Francovich 12. 
227
 ECJ, Francovich 12. 
228
 ECJ, Francovich 12. 
229
 ECJ, Francovich 12. 
230
 Encyclopedia of information technology law, 3.249/3. 
61 
 
 
6.3.2 Sufficiently serious incorrect implementation 
The incorrect implementation must be sufficiently serious.
231
 That depends on whether an EEA 
State has in the exercise of its legislative powers manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on 
the exercise of its powers.
232
 The factors that have to be determined for the conditions are the 
clarity and precision of the rule infringed, the measure of discretion left by that rule to the 
national authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or 
involuntary and whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable,
233
 the fact that the 
position taken by an EEA or Community institution may have contributed towards the omission 
and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to the EEA-
Agreement.
234
 These factors are determined by a national court.
235
 The finding of a breach of 
EEA Law is not in itself determinative because a mere infringement of EEA law by an EEA 
State does not necessarily constitute a sufficiently serious breach.
236
 A breach is considered to be 
sufficiently serious if it has persisted despite settled case law from which it is clear that the 
conduct in question constituted an infringement.
237
 Such case law from the ECJ does not exist as 
the Commission report from 2006 states.
238
 But there are some judgements courts in Slovenia 
and Finland where a discrimination of an electronic signature because it is electronic was 
dismissed.
239
 These two decisions might give a hint that the ECJ will not tolerate any 
discrimination because Art. 5 II ESD states clear the reasons why an electronic signature cannot 
denied legal effectiveness but this is quite hard to predict.  
Because this rule gives a very basic protection against a certain sort of discrimination it gives a 
lot of discretion to the national authority which legal effect an electronic signature has which is 
not a qualified signature according to Art. 5 I ESD. The Norwegian government saw quite 
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clearly that the non-discrimination rule was not implemented into Norwegian law
240
 but they 
assumed that the principles of the free consideration of evidence as well as the freedom of giving 
evidence includes the non-discrimination rule. This is valid if one considers the admissibility of 
an electronic signature as evidence but not for the legal effectiveness of an electronic signature.  
Considering this breach if it was involuntary or intentional this seems to be intentional as the 
government clearly knew that it does not implement the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD. 
But as the Norwegian government considered the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD 
implemented through existing Norwegian Law this failure seems to be merely involuntary. In the 
light that the free considering of evidence includes a consideration of the legal effect it seems to 
be possible but unlikely that a judge denies solely a legal effect of an electronic signature 
because it is electronic or not a qualified signature while he is not denying the admissibility as 
evidence before court out of that reason. The principle of free consideration does not hinder such 
a result because it gives the judge the choice to decide what reasons he finds sufficient and 
thorough enough to consider evidence. The principle of free consideration makes such a 
consideration only mere improbable.  
 As stated above the legal effect of an electronic signature is not only found in court, it is 
effective outside the court as well and there is the chance as well that an electronic signature is 
discriminated by the legislator because of the reasons forbidden by Art. 5 II ESD.  
These two points which are not implemented into Norwegian Law are part of the main provision 
of the ESD,
241
 a discretion what the minimum recognition of an electronic signature is. An 
improbability that such discrimination is not happening is not sufficient enough to ensure a non-
discrimination of electronic signatures according to Art. 5 II ESD because this ends in a legal 
uncertainty for the citizens. They, as legal lay persons, cannot foresee what the judge will 
consider as content of an electronic signature if the judge is considering the electronic signatures 
as evidence.  
The aim of the ESD is to harmonise the legal recognition of electronic signatures to strengthen 
confidence in electronic signatures and the general appliance of them.
242
 Divergent rules with 
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respect to the legal recognition are according to Rec. 4 ESD considered to hinder the free 
movement of goods because they create barriers in the use of electronic signatures. These 
barriers are considered to hinder the use of electronic communications and electronic commerce. 
This hinders to implement an internal market. As Rec. 20 ESD considers harmonised criteria for 
the legal effects of electronic signatures this will preserve a coherent legal framework across the 
Community. The aim of an internal market will be reached. The establishment of the internal 
market is according to Art. 1 EEA-Agreement the main aim of the Agreement. Therefore the 
missing implementation of the non-discrimination rule of Art. 5 II ESD can be considered to 
hinder the establishment of the internal market because the legal recognition of electronic 
signatures is not coherent with in the rest of Europe. A breach of such an important part of the 
ESD is therefore considered to be sufficiently serious.  
6.3.3 Loss of an action 
If or if not a case is lost because of this implementation can be just a presumption in this work. 
This seems unlikely but possible. Therefore Norway might be held liable for the missing 
implementation of the non-discrimination rule.  
6.4 Non-Compliance of letter l) of Annex II ESD 
The non-implementation of letter l) of Annex II ESD might constitute a breach of ESD law as 
well. The requirements in Annex II ESD for the certification-service-providers are mandatory. 
As the technology does not give the possibility to fulfil letter l) of the Annex II today, it seems to 
be not harmful to not implement that letter. But as Telenor pointed out in Otp prp. 82 (1999-
2000) this might be a problem with further technological developments. Although it does not 
lead now to problems, it might cause problems with a further developed technology which makes 
subsequent changes in the certificate traceable because then the Norwegian implementation has 
created different rules for certificate-service-providers which might develop a barrier within 
electronic communication.  
64 
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7 Conclusion 
The ESA and the ESD have both established a system for legal recognition of electronic 
signatures. Both laws use the same three sorts of electronic signatures, electronic signatures, 
advanced electronic signatures and qualified signatures.  
An electronic signature serves in both Laws the purpose of identifying someone via the form of 
an attachment of an electronic document while an advanced electronic signature has got stricter 
requirements as it should uniquely link to and identify a person, should detect alteration of the 
document and should be created by a device under the sole control of the signatory. The 
„highest‟ form of a signature is the qualified signature, that is an advanced electronic signature 
that is based on a qualified certificate which fulfils certain information requirements and is 
issued by a qualified certification issuer who fulfils certain organisational, data protection and 
informational duties and is based on a secure signature creation device. Only qualified signatures 
are presumed according to both regulations to be equivalent with handwritten signatures. The 
electronic signatures should get a minimum protection against non-discrimination according to 
Art. 5 II ESD while the Norwegian solution is to allow an electronic signature maybe the same 
legal recognition as a qualified one in Section 6 S. 2 ESA. This approach serves very well the 
particular function a signature serves according to the respective legal requirement.
243
 It gives the 
judges a very broad guideline about the content an electronic signature proofs. This „functional‟ 
approach has got the same flexibility as the non-discrimination rule and is more elegant. The 
ESD gives no guidelines to the judges, only a prohibition what they should not consider as denial 
of a legal effect.  But this Norwegian solution does not comply with the solution of the Directive 
because it allows discrimination. Although a non-discrimination in the field of the admissibility 
as evidence of an electronic signature is implemented in Norwegian Law through the principle of 
free giving of evidence the legal effect of an electronic signature can be denied if a judge 
                                                 
243
 Riisnæs, Digital Certificates and Certification Services, 3.7. 
66 
 
considers a general finding like the electronic format is sufficient enough to deny a legal effect 
for an electronic signature. The same problem occurs with the legal effect of an electronic 
signature outside of a court for the legislator. The legislator is free to discriminate electronic 
signatures because of the forbidden reasons because he can give exemptions to existing law. This 
means that a legislator can consider in a legislative act that an electronic signature is denied a 
legal effect because of its electronic format.  
The question is what consequences such a breach of EEA-Law might have. As the EEA is not a 
supranational organisation like the EU a direct effect of the ESD must be denied because that 
would be an infringement of the sovereignty of an EEA-State. But if some requirements are 
fulfilled the breach can lead to a state liability as developed under EFTA-Court Law. The 
incorrect implementation of the non-discrimination rule is a sufficiently serious breach of the 
EEA-Agreement and the Directive confers an individual right to a subject because the ESD 
guarantees a user of an electronic signature a protection of his electronic signature against 
discrimination because it is electronic or not a qualified signature.  
The third requirement, a loss of a case is not fulfilled yet, but this might happen. Under the 
condition that someone loses a case because the electronic signature he uses is discriminated out 
of the reasons laid down in Art. 5 II ESD, Norway would be liable for that loss. If such a case 
happens in reality, only time will tell. From a European perspective the incorrect implementation 
of Art. 5 II ESD harms if it hinders to reach the goals the ESD wants to achieve. As Rec. 4 ESD 
states should the ESD strengthen the confidence in and the general acceptance of electronic 
signatures with clear rules regarding the legal recognition of them. Divergent rules for the legal 
recognition create a significant barrier to the use of electronic communications and electronic 
commerce. This will be hindering the free movement of goods and services of the internal 
market. To create a European internal market is the main reason why the EEA was established, 
see Art. 1 EEA Agreement. From a European perspective this implementation hinders the 
establishing of an internal market with respect to electronic communications and e-commerce 
because the minimum of legal recognition of an electronic signature is not guaranteed in 
Norway.  
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